If negotiations with Iran collapse, the U.S. likely is to move quickly to degrade Tehran’s military capabilities — a campaign analysts say would begin with missile systems, naval assets and command networks before escalating to more controversial targets.

Negotiators are still working toward what officials describe as a preliminary framework agreement — effectively a one-page starting point for broader talks centered on Iran’s nuclear program and potential sanctions relief. But deep mistrust on both sides has left the process fragile, raising the stakes if diplomacy fails.

«We’re not starting at zero,» retired Army Lt. Col. Seth Krummrich, a former Joint Staff planner and current global risk analyst, told Fox News Digital. «We’re both starting at minus 1,000 because neither side trusts each other at all. This is going to be a pretty hard process going forward.» 

That tension was on display Thursday, when a senior U.S. official confirmed American forces struck Iran’s Qeshm port and Bandar Abbas — key locations near the Strait of Hormuz — while insisting the operation did not mark a restart of the war or the end of the ceasefire.

The strike on one of Iran’s oil ports came two days after Iran launched 15 ballistic and cruise missiles at the UAE’s Fujairah Port, drawing anger from Gulf allies. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine said earlier this week the attack did not rise to the level of breaking the ceasefire, describing it as a low-level strike.

President Donald Trump repeatedly has warned that if negotiations collapse, the U.S. could resume bombing Iran — even signaling before the recent ceasefire was implemented that Washington could target the country’s energy infrastructure and key economic assets. But any escalation would likely unfold in phases, beginning with efforts to dismantle Iran’s ability to project force across the region before expanding to more controversial targets.

If talks break down, any renewed conflict would likely become a «contest for escalation control,» where Iran seeks to impose costs without provoking regime-threatening retaliation while the U.S. works to strip away Tehran’s remaining leverage, according to retired Air Force Lt. Gen. David Deptula.

«The capabilities that would come into focus are the ones Iran uses to generate coercive leverage: ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, air defense systems, maritime strike assets, command-and-control networks, IRGC infrastructure, proxy support channels, and nuclear-related facilities,» he said, referring to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. 

«The military objective would be less about punishment and more about denying Iran the tools it uses to escalate,» he said. 

«President Trump has all the cards, and he wisely keeps all options on the table to ensure that Iran can never possess a nuclear weapon,» White House spokesperson Olivia Wales told Fox News Digital. The Pentagon could not immediately be reached for comment. 

One early focus could be Iran’s fleet of fast attack boats in the Strait of Hormuz — a central component of Tehran’s ability to threaten global shipping in one of the world’s most critical energy corridors.

RP Newman, a military and terrorism analyst and Marine Corp veteran, said leaving much of that fleet intact during earlier strikes was a mistake.

IRAN’S REMAINING WEAPONS: HOW TEHRAN CAN STILL DISRUPT THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ

«We’ve blown up six of them,» he said. «They’ve got about 400 left.» 

The small, fast-moving boats are a key part of Iran’s asymmetric maritime strategy, capable of harassing commercial tankers and U.S. naval forces — and could quickly become a priority target in any renewed campaign.

Much of Iran’s core military structure also remains intact.

INSIDE IRAN’S MILITARY: MISSILES, MILITIAS AND A FORCE BUILT FOR SURVIVAL

Newman said «we’ve only killed less than one percent of IRGC troops,» leaving a large portion of the force still capable of carrying out operations. He estimated the group «numbers between 150 and 190,000.»

But targeting the IRGC is far more complex than eliminating senior leadership.

«They’re not just a group of leaders at the top that you can kill away,» Krummrich said. «Over 47 years it’s percolated down to every level.»

An excavator removes rubble at the site of a strike that destroyed half of the Khorasaniha Synagogue and nearby residential buildings in Tehran, Iran, on April 7, 2026, according to a security official at the scene. (Francisco Seco/AP)

Retired Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies policy institute, said Washington may continue tightening economic pressure before broadening military action, arguing the U.S. should «squeeze them for at least another three to six weeks» before considering more aggressive escalation.

«You could have blown Kharg Island back to smithereens,» Krummrich said, referring to Iran’s primary oil export terminal in the Persian Gulf. «But what the planner said was, no — what we can do is a maritime blockade. It will have the same effect.»

Iran has continued moving crude through covert shipping networks and ship-to-ship transfers, with tanker trackers reporting millions of barrels still reaching markets in recent weeks.

A CIA analysis found Iran may be able to sustain those pressures for another three to four months before facing more severe economic strain, according to a report by The Washington Post.

The question is how far a U.S. campaign could expand if initial pressure fails to force concessions.

Trump has signaled a willingness to go further, warning before the ceasefire that the U.S. could «completely obliterate» Iran’s electric generating plants, oil infrastructure and key export hubs such as Kharg Island if a deal is not reached.

Strikes on the Iranian leadership, the IRGC, and Iranian naval vessels and oil infrastructure have roiled the markets. ( Sasan / Middle East Images / AFP via Getty Images)

«You don’t do that at first,» Montgomery said, describing strikes on dual-use infrastructure as a conditional step dependent on Iran’s response.

Targeting dual-use infrastructure presents significant legal and operational challenges.

«I’ve got 500 people standing on my target. You can’t hit that,» Newman said.

Such decisions carry political and legal risks, particularly given the likelihood of international scrutiny.

Broader infrastructure strikes also could create long-term instability if they push Iran toward internal collapse.

«In the short term, it might help. But in the long term, we’re all going to have to deal with it,» Krummrich said. «Once you pull that lever, you’re basically pushing Iran closer to the edge of the abyss.»

A collapse of state authority could create a failed-state scenario across the Strait of Hormuz, with armed groups, drones and missiles operating unchecked in one of the world’s most strategically important waterways.

Even some of the most discussed military options — such as seizing Iran’s highly enriched uranium — would be extremely difficult to execute.

«That’s much harder than it sounds,» said Montgomery.

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Such a mission would likely take months, and require engineers, technicians and heavy excavation equipment, in addition to thousands of U.S. operators providing continuous air coverage.

«When you start to stack that up, that becomes resource intensive and high risk — not even high, extreme risk,» said Krummrich.

This is part one of a series examining the challenges confronting the NATO alliance.

NATO has become a «bloated architecture» too dependent on American military power, former senior national security advisor Keith Kellogg told Fox News Digital.

As President Donald Trump pressures NATO allies to spend more on defense — ordering the withdrawal of 5,000 U.S. troops from Germany and signaling possible cuts in Spain and Italy — a deeper concern is emerging inside the alliance: despite years of rising European defense budgets, NATO still depends heavily on American military power, from missile defense and intelligence to logistics and nuclear deterrence. 

The growing gap between political commitments and real military capability is now fueling calls for structural changes inside the alliance as NATO confronts mounting threats from Russia and instability in the Middle East.

TRUMP ‘RIGHT TO BE OUTRAGED’ BY EUROPE’S BETRAYAL ON IRAN, SAYS FORMER THATCHER ADVISOR

NATO’s imbalance is not theoretical — and it is not new, retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg told Fox News Digital, «I told the president… maybe you ought to talk about a tiered relationship with NATO,» Kellogg described conversations with Trump in his first term about the alliance’s future. «…we need to develop a new, for lack of a better term, a new NATO a new defensive alignment with  Europe.»

Kellogg added the alliance has expanded politically but not militarily — creating what he sees as a growing gap between commitments and real capability.

«You started with 12, and you went to 32, and in the process, I think you diluted the impact,» he argued, calling today’s NATO «a very bloated architecture.»

«They haven’t put the money into defense. Their defense industry and defense forces have atrophied. When you look at the Brits right now, they could barely deploy forces: they have two aircraft carriers, both under maintenance. Their brigades are like one out of six that work. And you just look at the capability, it’s just not there. So I think we need to realize that and say, well, we need something different,» Kellogg, who is the co-chair of the Center for American Security at the America First Foreign Policy Institute, told Fox News Digital.

But not everyone agrees the alliance is losing relevance.

«It has never been more relevant,» said John R. Deni, a research professor at the U.S. Army War College, who says NATO remains central to U.S. national security.

«The reason for that is twofold,» he said. «One, it’s our comparative advantage versus the Chinese and the Russians… they don’t have anything like this.»

«And the second reason… NATO underwrites the security and stability of our most important trade and investment relationship,» he added, referring to economic ties between North America and Europe.

NATO ALLIES CLASH AFTER RUSSIAN JETS BREACH AIRSPACE, TESTING ALLIANCE RESOLVE

NATO chiefs of defense hold a meeting in Brussels on Aug. 20, 2025, with screens displaying allied leaders joining remotely to discuss Ukraine. (Fox News)

Dependence: Design or Weakness?

By around 2010, the United States accounted for roughly 65% to 70% of NATO defense spending, according to analysis provided by Barak Seener from the Henry Jackson Society, a London-based think tank.

«They’ve always been dependent on the U.S.,» Kellogg said of the European allies.

«The allies overall rely upon one another for deterrence and defense by design,» Deni said, explaining that alliances exist to «pool their resources» and «aggregate their individual strengths.»

Deni pointed to ground forces as a clear example of what the U.S. gains from the alliance, noting that «there are far more allied mechanized infantry forces on the ground than there are Americans.»

NATO CHIEF SIGNALS ALLIES MAY ACT ON HORMUZ, WARNS OF ‘UNHEALTHY CODEPENDENCE’ ON US

Still, he acknowledged that reliance has at times gone too far.

«In the past… it was fair to say that the European allies were overly reliant upon the Americans for conventional defense,» he said, pointing to the 2000s.

That, he said, was partly driven by U.S. priorities — as Washington pushed European allies to focus on wars in Afghanistan and Iraq rather than territorial defense.

A Polish Army soldier sits in a tank as a NATO flag flies behind during the NATO Noble Jump VJTF exercises on June 18, 2015, in Zagan, Poland. (Sean Gallup/Getty Images)

Seener describes NATO as «formally collective, but functionally asymmetric,» with the U.S. providing a disproportionate share of «high-end capabilities.»

That asymmetry is most visible in nuclear deterrence.

Seener said the U.S. provides the overwhelming majority of NATO’s nuclear arsenal — including intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched systems and strategic bombers — meaning deterrence ultimately relies on the assumption of U.S. retaliation.

A NATO official told Fox News Digital that, «The U.S. nuclear deterrent cannot be replaced, but it is clear that Europe needs to step up. There’s no question. There needs to be a better balance when it comes to our defense and security. Both because we see the vital role the U.S. plays around the world and the resources that it demands, and also because it is only fair.»

«The good news,» the official added, «is that the Allies are doing exactly that. They are stepping up, working together — and with the U.S. — to ensure we collectively have what we need to deter and defend one billion people living across the Euro-Atlantic area.»

NATO LAUNCHES ARCTIC SECURITY PUSH AS TRUMP EYES GREENLAND TAKEOVER

Boeing CH-47 Chinook helicopters of the U.S. Army 12th Combat Aviation Brigade fly over a Lithuanian Vilkas infantry fighting vehicle during the Allied Spirit 25 military exercise near Hohenfels, Germany, on March 12, 2025.

The Systems NATO Cannot Replace

Beyond nuclear weapons, the dependence runs through the alliance’s operational backbone.

Seener pointed to U.S.-provided intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance — as well as logistics and command systems — as essential to NATO operations.

«Without U.S. intelligence and surveillance, NATO loses situational awareness and early warning capabilities,» Seener said, adding, «So that means that Russia, for example, can attack Europe. And theoretically, if there’s no NATO and the U.S. is not involved, Europe would not be aware, or it would take it too long to be able to defend itself.»

Kellogg also says that much of Europe’s military capability falls short of top-tier systems.

«For the most part, their equipment, if you had to grade it A, B, C, D, E, F, they’re kind of like B players or C players,» he said. «It’s not the first line of work.»

He pointed to air and missile defense as a key gap, noting that while European countries rely on U.S.-made systems such as Patriot and THAAD, «they don’t have a system that’s comparable.»

Kellogg attributed that to years of underinvestment, saying European defense industries «have atrophied,» adding that the United States is also now «relearning that as well.»

TRUMP AFFIRMS US ‘WILL ALWAYS BE THERE FOR NATO,’ WHILE EXPRESSING DOUBTS ABOUT ALLIANCE

President Donald Trump and Poland’s President Andrzej Duda talk during a working lunch at the NATO leaders summit in Watford, Britain, on Dec. 4, 2019. (Kevin Lamarque/Reuters)

Deni said the picture today is more mixed.

«Alliance defense spending has been up… and has spiked far more after 2022,» he said, pointing to Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 as a turning point.

But he cautioned that capability gains take time, noting that many improvements are still years away from full deployment.

Deni pointed to recent European purchases of U.S. systems as evidence of growing capability, noting that countries including Poland, Romania, Norway and Denmark are acquiring the F-35 fighter jet from the U.S.

«You can’t build an F-35 overnight,» he said, adding that many of these improvements will take years to fully materialize.

A NATO official told Fox News Digital the alliance «needs to move further and faster» to meet growing threats, pointing to new capability targets agreed by defense ministers in June 2025.

Keith Kellogg speaks during the Warsaw Security Forum on Sept. 30, 2025, in Poland. (Marek Antoni Iwanczuk/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

The official said priorities include air and missile defense, long-range weapons, logistics and large land forces, noting that while details remain classified, plans call for a fivefold increase in air and missile defense, «thousands more» armored vehicles and tanks, and «millions more» artillery shells. NATO also aims to double key enabling capabilities such as logistics, transportation and medical support.

The official added that allies are increasing investments in warships, aircraft, drones, long-range missiles, as well as space and cyber capabilities, while boosting readiness and modernizing command and control.

«These targets are now included in national plans,» the official said, adding that allies must demonstrate how they will meet them through sustained defense spending and capability development.

The NATO official also noted that European allies lead multinational forces across Central and Eastern Europe, while the U.S. and Canada serve as framework nations in Poland and Latvia, alongside ongoing air policing missions and NATO’s KFOR operation in Kosovo.

A Swedish Air Force JAS 39 Gripen fighter aircraft takes off from southern Sweden on April 2, 2011. (AP Photo/Scanpix/Patric Soderstrom, File)

What happens if the U.S. is stretched?

Kellogg’s warning is direct: NATO’s deterrence depends on U.S. presence.

«The one you always have to worry about… is Russia,» Kellogg, who was Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine and Russia in 2025, said.

If U.S. forces are tied down elsewhere, NATO could face serious strain — particularly in areas like intelligence and logistics.

For Kellogg, the danger is delay. «We won’t know until it happens,» he said. «And then you won’t be able to respond to it.»

Deni, however, said the alliance remains a strategic asset — not a liability.

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A NATO military force stands guard outside the World Forum in The Hague ahead of the two-day NATO summit on June 22, 2025. (Remko de Waal/ANP/AFP)

The question, he suggests, is not whether NATO still works. It is whether allies can adapt fast enough to keep it working.

Con raíces en la Unión Soviética y en la KGB, la propaganda y la manipulación informativa han sido pilares de algunos de los sistemas políticos más rígidos. En ese marco, la adopción acelerada de tecnologías digitales se ha convertido, por su propia naturaleza, en una herramienta funcional a la influencia política, la invocación de la seguridad nacional y la administración de la narrativa pública.

En las últimas horas, diversas fuentes de inteligencia analizan la posibilidad de un atentado contra el líder ruso e incluso escenarios de desestabilización interna. Más allá de esas hipótesis, lo verificable es que desde mayo de 2026 Rusia ha intensificado las restricciones sobre la conectividad móvil en Moscú y otras regiones, en particular durante eventos sensibles como el Día de la Victoria. Si bien estas medidas se justifican formalmente en razones de seguridad —entre ellas la amenaza de ataques con drones ucranianos— su impacto cotidiano revela algo más profundo. La interrupción de servicios afecta pagos digitales, operaciones bancarias, transporte, navegación y comunicación básica, al tiempo que dificulta el uso de aplicaciones de mensajería como Telegram.

Vladimir Putin ha sostenido la necesidad de reforzar estos controles tras más de cuatro años de conflicto desde la invasión a Ucrania en 2022. Ambos países se encuentran inmersos en una guerra de drones sin precedentes, en la que dispositivos de largo alcance impactan tanto en centros de mando como en infraestructuras críticas, especialmente en el sector energético. En ese contexto, Ucrania ha logrado alcanzar objetivos en territorio ruso —incluso en zonas industriales como Kirishi— mientras que Moscú informó haber interceptado centenares de drones en una sola noche.

Las preocupaciones del entorno presidencial se han intensificado desde que ataques ucranianos lograron aproximarse a instalaciones sensibles, incluyendo el propio Kremlin y residencias vinculadas al mandatario. En paralelo, Rusia cuenta con la capacidad técnica de aislarse de la red global mediante el desarrollo de Runet, un sistema que el país viene probando desde hace años bajo el argumento de protegerse de interferencias externas.

Lo que en sus inicios se presentaba como una medida preventiva, comienza a consolidarse en 2026 como un instrumento de control interno. La progresiva implementación de este modelo no sólo permite regular el acceso a la información, sino también condicionar la formación de la opinión pública e incluso facilitar mecanismos de vigilancia. En este sentido, la hiperconectividad contemporánea se convierte en una fuente constante de datos, particularmente valiosa para regímenes con vocación de control.

Las restricciones se concentran en grandes centros urbanos como San Petersburgo, donde se registran cortes prolongados en determinadas zonas. Sin embargo, no se trata de un apagón uniforme, sino de un esquema selectivo que habilita únicamente plataformas incluidas en listas aprobadas por el gobierno. Esta lógica impacta de lleno en la vida cotidiana. Comercios y ciudadanos enfrentan dificultades para realizar transacciones, muchas de las cuales solo pueden concretarse en efectivo, mientras que tareas básicas como utilizar un GPS se vuelven inciertas.

En la práctica, esto se configura como un control estatal sobre las telecomunicaciones. El Servicio Federal de Seguridad dispone de facultades para ordenar interrupciones del servicio, respaldado por un marco legal que obliga a los operadores a acatar estas decisiones sin necesidad de fundamentaciones específicas. Frente a este escenario, los ciudadanos apelan a alternativas informales, como redes wifi públicas en cafeterías o cadenas gastronómicas, aunque la principal estrategia consiste en el uso de VPN. Aun así, estas herramientas también comienzan a ser bloqueadas con creciente rapidez.

Este esquema dista de ser novedoso, aunque su consolidación actual evidencia una tendencia más amplia hacia un modelo digital cerrado y centralizado. Se trata de una arquitectura que busca institucionalizar una “internet soberana”, en línea con el camino recorrido por China, cuyo sistema de control sobre el ciberespacio se ha convertido en referencia para otros regímenes.

Gabriel Zurdo es especialista en ciberseguridad, riesgo tecnológico y negocios.