En el vasto andamiaje del pensamiento contemporáneo, pocas figuras han diseccionado las dinámicas del poder con la crudeza conceptual de Jorge Bergoglio. Mucho antes de convertirse en el Papa Francisco, el entonces arzobispo de Buenos Aires ya orbitaba alrededor de una obsesión que combinaba la teología pastoral con la sociología de las instituciones: la naturaleza destructiva de la corrupción. Sobre este asunto dejó un gran aforismo: “El corrupto no conoce la fraternidad, conoce la complicidad”.

Detrás de esta línea hay una tesis filosófica que define la corrupción como la negación absoluta del lazo social y la instauración de una mafia del espíritu. Aunque el mundo la escuchó con resonancia global el 23 de octubre de 2014, cuando el Papa Francisco la pronunció en el Aula del Sínodo de la Ciudad del Vaticano ante los miembros de la Asociación Internacional de Derecho Penal, la idea ya había sido gestada casi una década antes en el ruidoso escenario de la crisis argentina.

La matriz conceptual de esta declaración se encuentra en Corrupción y pecado: algunas reflexiones en torno al tema de la corrupción, un breve pero filoso ensayo publicado por Jorge Bergoglio en el año 2005. En aquellas páginas, escritas bajo el pulso de una sociedad que aún suturaba las heridas políticas y económicas del cambio de siglo, el cardenal se propuso delimitar una frontera invisible pero insalvable para la Iglesia católica: la sutil distancia que separa al pecador del corrupto.

Cuando en 2014 se paró frente a los máximos penalistas del mundo, no lo hizo para hablar exclusivamente de códigos o procedimientos técnicos, sino para describir la psicología del criminal de cuello blanco. Fue en ese contexto de debate sobre los abusos del poder punitivo y la criminalidad económica donde la frase cobró su dimensión definitiva. ¿Por qué el corrupto es incapaz de la fraternidad? Para el Papa Francisco, la fraternidad requiere una simetría moral y la aceptación de la vulnerabilidad del otro.

En su concepción, el hermano es un igual con quien se comparte un destino común. El corrupto, atrapado en una paranoia de impunidad, es incapaz de mirar al otro sin calcular su utilidad. La complicidad es, entonces, la siniestra parodia de la amistad. Mientras que la amistad libera, la complicidad encadena; mientras que la fraternidad se funda en la transparencia, la complicidad exige el secreto compartimentado. Los hombres libres se asocian para construir; los cómplices, para encubrir.

En la arquitectura mental que Jorge Bergoglio describe, el corrupto no tiene amigos, tiene socios; no genera redes de contención, sino pactos de silencio. Quien no entra en la transa colectiva no es un disidente: es un enemigo directo que amenaza la estabilidad del sistema. Esta idea no es un satélite periférico en su producción intelectual; es el centro de gravedad de su geopolítica y sus encíclicas más disruptivas. El pensamiento bergogliano se hamaca siempre entre dos polos: la comunión y la fragmentación.

A diferencia del pecador común, que experimenta la culpa y el peso de su caída —vía que el pensamiento católico clásico explora en obras que van desde las Confesiones de San Agustín hasta la literatura existencialista de Graham Greene—, el corrupto analizado por Jorge Bergoglio ha anestesiado su conciencia. El corrupto no se siente en falta; se siente un ganador. Vive en un estado de autosuficiencia donde la impunidad, y su consiguiente autopreservación, ha sido internalizada como un derecho adquirido.

En última instancia, al denunciar que el corrupto solo conoce la complicidad, el Papa Francisco despoja a la corrupción de su ropaje meramente financiero. Nos advierte que el verdadero peligro de este flagelo no es el dinero que se desvía, sino la degradación antropológica que produce: la transformación de una comunidad de hermanos en una asociación ilícita de cómplices. Esas palabras tan simples y a la vez tan profundas vuelven a sonar hoy cuando —lo vimos estos días— la corrupción sigue enquistada.

Jorge Mario Bergoglio, conocido como el Papa Francisco, nació en Buenos Aires, Argentina, el 17 de diciembre de 1936. Hijo de inmigrantes italianos, se graduó como técnico químico antes de descubrir su vocación religiosa y unirse a la Compañía de Jesús en 1958. Su carrera eclesiástica avanzó con rapidez: se desempeñó como provincial de los jesuitas en Argentina y, en 1998, asumió como arzobispo de Buenos Aires, cargo desde el cual se convirtió en una figura central de la Iglesia latinoamericana.

Su liderazgo cercano, su estilo de vida austero y su constante preocupación por las periferias marcaron su gestión pastoral en el país, consolidando un perfil profundamente enfocado en la justicia social y el cuidado de los sectores más vulnerables. El 13 de marzo de 2013 hizo historia al ser elegido como el papa número 266 de la Iglesia católica, convirtiéndose en el primer pontífice jesuita y el primero proveniente de América. Adoptó el nombre de Francisco en honor a San Francisco de Asís.

A lo largo de sus doce años de pontificado, impulsó reformas estructurales en la curia romana, abogó por la transparencia financiera e instaló debates globales a través de encíclicas fundamentales como Laudato si’ (sobre el cuidado del medio ambiente) y Fratelli tutti (sobre la fraternidad y la amistad social). Tras un prolongado deterioro de su salud debido a afecciones respiratorias, falleció a los 88 años el 21 de abril de 2025 en su residencia de la Casa de Santa Marta, en la Ciudad del Vaticano.

After weeks of Iranian missile and drone attacks exposed the vulnerability of major U.S. military bases across the Gulf, the Pentagon is weighing whether decades of relying on large, permanent installations within range of Iranian weapons still makes strategic sense.

Defense officials are considering dispersing some capabilities and reassessing parts of the U.S. regional base posture, according to a Wall Street Journal report.

The Gulf base network is how the U.S. responds quickly to Iran, protects shipping lanes, reassures Arab partners and keeps pressure on ISIS and al Qaeda. If the Pentagon reduces or disperses that footprint, it could make U.S. forces harder to hit — but also slower to surge in a crisis.

For decades, the tradeoff was straightforward: the closer U.S. forces were to the fight, the faster they could respond. But Operation Epic Fury reignited a long-running debate over whether concentrating aircraft, ships, command centers and thousands of troops at a handful of large Gulf bases had become an increasingly dangerous liability in an era of precision missiles and drones.

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Retired Navy Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery said the military already has started relying more heavily on alternate command-and-control locations — the headquarters and communications hubs commanders use to direct military operations — and rotating forces rather than concentrating capabilities at a handful of installations close to Iran. 

«We’re not relying on them in the same way that we did before the war,» Montgomery told Fox News Digital. «I think we are going to reposition these forces.»

The Pentagon has spent decades building a network of Gulf bases designed to put aircraft, ships and troops within minutes of potential crises across the Middle East. That strategy relied on concentrating combat power at a handful of large installations that offered unmatched access to the region.

But during Operation Epic Fury, Iran launched repeated missile and drone attacks against some of the Pentagon’s most important regional installations, including Naval Support Activity Bahrain, home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet, Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates and Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait.

While U.S. and partner air defenses intercepted many incoming weapons and casualties remained limited, the attacks demonstrated that virtually every major American operating hub in the Gulf now sits within range of Iranian missiles and drones.

U.S. forces in the Middle East have endured rocket and drone attacks for years, many carried out by Iranian-backed proxy groups against individual outposts in Iraq and Syria. Operation Epic Fury marked a broader test of the Pentagon’s regional basing model, with Iran directly targeting multiple major air and naval hubs that underpin U.S. military operations across the Gulf.

Naval Support Activity Bahrain alone sustained extensive damage to command facilities and communications infrastructure, The Wall Street Journal reported. Since the conflict began Feb. 28, 13 U.S. service members have been killed and 400 wounded, with most wounded returning to duty.  

Many of the fatalities resulted from a small number of attacks, including a missile strike in Kuwait and an attack on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia.

Navy Capt. Tim Hawkins, Central Command spokesperson, declined to discuss battle damage assessments but told Fox News Digital the U.S. military «rightfully prioritized the protection of people over buildings, and our strategy of protecting people worked. Iran shot more than 8,000 missiles and drones and only two resulted in U.S. fatalities. We did far more damage to Iran than they did to us — by a lot.»

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What that future posture ultimately looks like remains under review. 

A senior U.S. official told Fox News Digital questions about dispersing forces and reducing reliance on a handful of large Gulf bases had been debated since well before Operation Epic Fury, which had reignited those conversations. 

«As a planning organization, we continually assess the security environment and make adjustments to best support operations and protect our troops. This has always been the case and remains so going forward,» Hawkins said in response. 

Defense officials are weighing whether to disperse military capabilities across a broader network of facilities, move some bases or functions further west and even relocate certain operations to Israel, while reducing the U.S. presence at some installations in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the Journal reported. Officials also are reportedly considering moving some command structures underground, or forgoing rebuilding damaged structures. 

«We do not have any force posture changes to announce or anything to provide at this time,» a War Department official told Fox News Digital. 

A Joint Staff spokesperson told Fox News Digital that the military is tracking diplomatic developments in the region while continually monitoring and evaluating U.S. force posture.

Former counterterrorism director Joe Kent, who resigned over the Trump administration’s war with Iran, has long pushed for the U.S. to reduce its presence in the Gulf. 

«Our bases in the Middle East are strategic liabilities not strategic assets. Less bases = less targets for Iran to shoot at and that = less leverage for Iran,» he wrote on X Saturday. 

Aftermath of an Iranian missile strike on a Navy 5th Fleet installation in Bahrain is shown above. (Stringer/Anadolu via Getty Images)

Map from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies showing Iran’s missile ranges. (The Foundation for Defense of Democracies)

«It’s absolutely being discussed,» Retired Adm. Kevin Donegan, the former commander of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, which leads U.S. naval operations across the Middle East, told Fox News Digital. «After (the Iran conflict) is over, I think in each country it’ll be independently evaluated based on our relationships with those countries.»

Montgomery said geography itself has become part of the problem. Many of the Gulf’s largest U.S. bases sit only about 90 miles from Iranian launch sites, leaving little time and space to respond to incoming drones.

«They’re just too close,» Montgomery said. «They’re…90 miles away from Iranian launch points.»

Fighter aircraft have become one of the primary tools for intercepting Iranian drones, but Montgomery said the Gulf’s proximity to Iran leaves defenders with less time and space to intercept drones after launch.

«Our way of shooting down drones, the best way is aircraft equipped with rockets,» he said. «But to do that, you got to get behind the drones. That’s hard.»

Moving some operations farther west would not put U.S. troops beyond the reach of all Iranian weapons. Iran’s longer-range missiles can reach Israel and other parts of the region, and former commanders cautioned that there may no longer be any truly safe rear area. 

But dispersing command nodes, aircraft, logistics hubs and personnel across more locations could reduce the risk that a single strike disabling a critical U.S. capability.

«Everywhere we have forces around the world, they are under the missile envelope of potential adversaries,» he said. «So, where do you go to?»

«What you can do is buy yourself a little time against the threat, but in the end, we still need to have access to basing, because our being in the Gulf is not just to revolve around Iran, we have other reasons to be there, whether that be to ensure that terrorists like ISIS and Al Qaeda, etc. don’t threaten stability,» Donegan went on. 

The bases that came under attack form the backbone of America’s military presence in the Gulf.

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The U.S. typically maintains about 40,000 troops across the Middle East, anchored by a network of major bases built up during the post-9/11 wars. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar —home to the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command and the largest U.S. military installation in the region — alone hosts about 10,000 American personnel. Other major hubs include Naval Support Activity Bahrain, home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet, Camp Arifjan and Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, and Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates.

Those installations became the backbone of U.S. military operations during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and remain central to American air, naval and logistics operations across the region.

Fox News Digital reached out to the U.S. Fifth Fleet, the White House and the governments of Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Israel for comment.

Trump has not publicly commented on the matter.